This is largely what is called a 'correspondence theory of truth', which was an approach pioneered by Bertrand Russell, and also G.E. Moore, who were at Cambridge together at the start of the twentieth century. There is still a thriving trade in correspondence theories, but it must be noticed that the very existence of a thriving trade in them is a sign that these have not managed to 'win out' in any serious way over competing approaches. Indeed, I think part of the situation that distinguishes the twentieth from the twenty first century in these terms is that the very idea of one theory 'winning out' has been largely abandoned, with reasons both good and bad.
I am intrigued by your suggestion "all the entries in our minds either correspond to, or are abstracted from entities in objective reality" - consider the 'snark' in a game of 'snark hunt', in which folks are taken on a hunt for an animal that in fact does not exist in any conventional sense. Do you want to say the 'snark' is abstracted from entities in objective reality...?
Your chosen approach here softens some of the corners of correspondence theories in ways that most proponents of such approaches usually want to avoid, but I find your approach (and others like it) intriguing, and it brings to mind also remarks in David Hume 1739 book A Treatise on Human Nature:
"All our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent."
I continue to ponder that claim - it is decidedly non-trivial.
However, I would caution you against using 'fact' as a synonym for 'evidence', as what is claimed as a 'fact' and what the evidence actually consists of are two radically different things. Nowhere is this clearer than when you get into the use of p-values in statistics, and a variety of related forms of mathematical sorcery that obfuscate what is the case. Evidently there is a way to make 'facts' and 'evidence' align, but the common usage of 'fact' slips wildly away from 'evidence' - and this is especially so wherever statistics are the most common toolset.
For instance, a pharmaceutical company claims has an experiment that shows that the unvaccinated suffer more deleterious effects than those that received their vaccine candidate. They claim this shows their candidate is 'safe and effective' (as a fact, and as another way of reporting this specific evidence). But the experimental design treats a person as 'unvaccinated' until two weeks after the administration of the candidate. So any adverse reactions within two weeks are attributed to 'unvaccinated' subjects, who in fact have received a dose but not yet had two weeks pass. This is not a hypothetical, this rather scurrilous methodology has indeed been used - even though it could show saline solution to be a 'safe and effective' treatment for just about anything! (This is because any time your methodology assigns different timespans to two arms, the longer time span arm has more background events e.g. heart attacks.)This is just one example of how 'fact' and 'evidence' can become blurred in ways that are not helpful.
Another issue to consider: the attempt to corral 'social reality' from 'physical reality' runs into problems when you start to recognise the overlaps between entities in social reality and the claims made about physical reality. This, I'd say, has been a recurrent theme in recent philosophy of science. A good example here is the electron - because what do we mean when we say 'electron'...? And does the electron 'exist'? Is it part of physical reality? Your correspondence theory allows for us to say that the electron is 'abstracted from' physical reality. This is weak sauce as far as such theories go, but it seems to me a fair way of approaching the issue, and it is certainly hard to do better with this kind of entity, which is as much an artefact of our experimental histories as anything else.
But this leads to another issue, a thought experiment if you will. Imagine a form of consciousness that exists encoded in a gravimetric field. What form of social reality does such a being experience...? You say "most of us accept as an absolute truth that we live on a planet that orbits a star" - I would suggest that this isn't true for this hypothetical gravity-being, for which planets and stars are indistinguishable, although they can 'feel' stars and gas giants more prominently than most planets.
This is an absurd example, but I think it is helpful to consider this case before considering whether, for instance, a tribesperson living in the Amazon accepts 'that we live on a planet that orbits a star', which is, ultimately, a construction of our social imaginary, and does not have quite the necessity that you perhaps intend here. This is a can of worms, to be sure, but it teases at the risks involved in going down these kinds of path.
Lastly, because I cannot resist, I want to say that "The earth and seven other planets revolve around the sun" is a false statement unless qualified. One must first accept the lazily evoked shortcut preferred by contemporary astronomers that 'a dwarf planet is not a planet', which is rather questionable. In no way is it necessary to accept this, and I flatly reject it. With my astrophysicist hat on I would say, rather, "The earth and three other terrestrial planets, four jovian planets, and at least eight dwarf planets orbit our sun".
There is no prima facie reason to exclude dwarf planets from being planets *except* the desire to claim that we know how many planets there are. This, I would suggest, is the only reason the International Astronomical Union chose this otherwise indefensible formulation. But the truth is: we do not know how many planets there are in our solar system. And it will be a long, long time before we do. That for me is a more wonderful, more accurate, and more humble way of approaching astronomy than the 'finger in a dyke' approach of saying dwarf planets are arbitrarily not planets, for which no experiment, no evidence, and no facts exist - nor could they exist, because ultimately it is pure hermeneutics, that is, social reality.
This is more than just game-playing on my part (although it is also this!) - it is a sign that this neat division into 'social reality' and 'physical reality' is intimately intricated and involuted in ways that do not tease apart to the degree that folks preferring correspondence theories tend to prefer. For these, and other reasons, I do not personally come at these problems in this way. But that doesn't mean you cannot. For where you are coming from, I would suggest you would be much happier with a correspondence theory. Just be aware that, as with so much in life, your epistemic mileage may vary.
This is largely what is called a 'correspondence theory of truth', which was an approach pioneered by Bertrand Russell, and also G.E. Moore, who were at Cambridge together at the start of the twentieth century. There is still a thriving trade in correspondence theories, but it must be noticed that the very existence of a thriving trade in them is a sign that these have not managed to 'win out' in any serious way over competing approaches. Indeed, I think part of the situation that distinguishes the twentieth from the twenty first century in these terms is that the very idea of one theory 'winning out' has been largely abandoned, with reasons both good and bad.
I am intrigued by your suggestion "all the entries in our minds either correspond to, or are abstracted from entities in objective reality" - consider the 'snark' in a game of 'snark hunt', in which folks are taken on a hunt for an animal that in fact does not exist in any conventional sense. Do you want to say the 'snark' is abstracted from entities in objective reality...?
Your chosen approach here softens some of the corners of correspondence theories in ways that most proponents of such approaches usually want to avoid, but I find your approach (and others like it) intriguing, and it brings to mind also remarks in David Hume 1739 book A Treatise on Human Nature:
"All our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent."
I continue to ponder that claim - it is decidedly non-trivial.
However, I would caution you against using 'fact' as a synonym for 'evidence', as what is claimed as a 'fact' and what the evidence actually consists of are two radically different things. Nowhere is this clearer than when you get into the use of p-values in statistics, and a variety of related forms of mathematical sorcery that obfuscate what is the case. Evidently there is a way to make 'facts' and 'evidence' align, but the common usage of 'fact' slips wildly away from 'evidence' - and this is especially so wherever statistics are the most common toolset.
For instance, a pharmaceutical company claims has an experiment that shows that the unvaccinated suffer more deleterious effects than those that received their vaccine candidate. They claim this shows their candidate is 'safe and effective' (as a fact, and as another way of reporting this specific evidence). But the experimental design treats a person as 'unvaccinated' until two weeks after the administration of the candidate. So any adverse reactions within two weeks are attributed to 'unvaccinated' subjects, who in fact have received a dose but not yet had two weeks pass. This is not a hypothetical, this rather scurrilous methodology has indeed been used - even though it could show saline solution to be a 'safe and effective' treatment for just about anything! (This is because any time your methodology assigns different timespans to two arms, the longer time span arm has more background events e.g. heart attacks.)This is just one example of how 'fact' and 'evidence' can become blurred in ways that are not helpful.
Another issue to consider: the attempt to corral 'social reality' from 'physical reality' runs into problems when you start to recognise the overlaps between entities in social reality and the claims made about physical reality. This, I'd say, has been a recurrent theme in recent philosophy of science. A good example here is the electron - because what do we mean when we say 'electron'...? And does the electron 'exist'? Is it part of physical reality? Your correspondence theory allows for us to say that the electron is 'abstracted from' physical reality. This is weak sauce as far as such theories go, but it seems to me a fair way of approaching the issue, and it is certainly hard to do better with this kind of entity, which is as much an artefact of our experimental histories as anything else.
But this leads to another issue, a thought experiment if you will. Imagine a form of consciousness that exists encoded in a gravimetric field. What form of social reality does such a being experience...? You say "most of us accept as an absolute truth that we live on a planet that orbits a star" - I would suggest that this isn't true for this hypothetical gravity-being, for which planets and stars are indistinguishable, although they can 'feel' stars and gas giants more prominently than most planets.
This is an absurd example, but I think it is helpful to consider this case before considering whether, for instance, a tribesperson living in the Amazon accepts 'that we live on a planet that orbits a star', which is, ultimately, a construction of our social imaginary, and does not have quite the necessity that you perhaps intend here. This is a can of worms, to be sure, but it teases at the risks involved in going down these kinds of path.
Lastly, because I cannot resist, I want to say that "The earth and seven other planets revolve around the sun" is a false statement unless qualified. One must first accept the lazily evoked shortcut preferred by contemporary astronomers that 'a dwarf planet is not a planet', which is rather questionable. In no way is it necessary to accept this, and I flatly reject it. With my astrophysicist hat on I would say, rather, "The earth and three other terrestrial planets, four jovian planets, and at least eight dwarf planets orbit our sun".
There is no prima facie reason to exclude dwarf planets from being planets *except* the desire to claim that we know how many planets there are. This, I would suggest, is the only reason the International Astronomical Union chose this otherwise indefensible formulation. But the truth is: we do not know how many planets there are in our solar system. And it will be a long, long time before we do. That for me is a more wonderful, more accurate, and more humble way of approaching astronomy than the 'finger in a dyke' approach of saying dwarf planets are arbitrarily not planets, for which no experiment, no evidence, and no facts exist - nor could they exist, because ultimately it is pure hermeneutics, that is, social reality.
This is more than just game-playing on my part (although it is also this!) - it is a sign that this neat division into 'social reality' and 'physical reality' is intimately intricated and involuted in ways that do not tease apart to the degree that folks preferring correspondence theories tend to prefer. For these, and other reasons, I do not personally come at these problems in this way. But that doesn't mean you cannot. For where you are coming from, I would suggest you would be much happier with a correspondence theory. Just be aware that, as with so much in life, your epistemic mileage may vary.
All the very best,
Chris.